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Abstract
In this paper an attempt is made to review how mentalistic notions such as inten-
tion, mental representation and generic knowledge had been treated in the study of
language before they started gaining the status they deserved in the early 1980s
with the development of cognitive linguistics and computational technology. Such
an attempt is necessary to locate the position of a type of mental representation
which the present author has been trying to describe in the tradition of the study
of written discourse.
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O. Introduction
In 1983 two influential works on written discourse were published: On the Suiface of
Discourse by Michael Hoey and Strategies of Discourse Comprehension by Teun A. van
Dijk and Walter Kintsch. Their research independently developed but both dealt with the
structure beyond the sentential boundary and are concerned with the reader's active interac-
tion with the text in the comprehension process. In the tradition established by them, a lot
of research has been done on comprehension, and various comprehension models have been
presented. I have also been trying to devise a model which interprets the comprehension
process as the reader's efforts to construct a coherent structure or frame comprising a set of
propositions among which the logical relation of biconditional is established. The resultant
frame is seen as representing the writer's communicative intention to share the view on the
world with the reader. The notion of intention which is crucial to my theory, however, was
not always accepted as a decent object of scientific study since it is an invisible mental en-
tity. It was avoided or excluded from the study like other mentalistic notions such as mental
representation, comprehension, purpose, goal and value. In this paper, several linguistic prin-
ciples advocated by influential scholars such as Bartlett, Bloomfield, Skinner and Chomsky
before the early 1980s are reviewed in terms of their positions in relation to mentalistic no-
tions.
1. Mental representations as the writer's communicative intention
Before discussing the position of mentalistic notions in the literature up to the early
1980s, in this section I briefly introduce what kind of mental representation I have been try-
ing to devise. The mentalistic notions discussed in the following sections are similar to the
notion of the writer's communicative intention only in that they are all invisible entity but in
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other aspects they are notions of very different kind. It is, therefore, important to know what
kind of mental entity the mental representation of the writer's communicative intention is.
m some of my preceding papers l one aspect of text comprehension is explained as a
process in which the reader of the text constructs a type of coherent mental representation
that is assumed to represent the writer's intention of producing the text. A similar view on
text comprehension was presented in the most comprehensive way by Van Dijk and Kintsch
(1983) and has been shared and developed by a group of discourse psychologists such as,
Graesser, Millis and Zwaan (1997), Van Dijk (2006), etc.
The recent development of cognitive science accompanied by the remarkable progress in
information technology has prepared a relatively favorable situation for postulating mental
entities in theory construction. Now it is possible to simulate assumed text comprehension
processes by creating computer programs which can perform various activities such as re-
sponding to questions about the content of the text as human subjects do. Gallistel (2001)
writes about the impact of computer science on the field as follows:
The cognitive revolution was closely tied to the emergence of computer science be-
cause computer science created indubitably physical machines that unequivocally
computed. This dispelled the widespread belief that computing was an inherently
mental activity in the dualistic sense-mental and therefore not physical.
Researchers have started believing that text comprehension, which could be interpreted as a
kind of computation, is also something physical that can be measured and tested using com-
puters.
The notion of mental representation, however, has not always been accepted uncondi-
tionally in the linguistic study. The situation is the same for other related mentalistic notions
such as mind, concept and idea. There is a good reason for this: they are not directly ob-
servable in spite of the development of artificial intelligence. As for a distrust of mentalistic
terms no other groups of scholars are better known than behaviorists, who attempted to give
their theory a scientific status by accepting only empirical evidence. Admitting that there are
various controversial features of behaviorism, their attitude to empirical data should be and
has been respected by many linguists. That is why there is a persistent distrust of mentalistic
terms and a cautious approach to the postulation of mental entities in theories.
The decision to incorporate the notion of mental representation into the theory, therefore,
requires some explanation. It is now commonly accepted that text comprehension depends
not only on the information explicit on the surface of text but also on the reader's generic
knowledge, purposes of reading, and various types of contextual information. The reader is
believed to integrate these different types of information to establish a coherent structure. I
presume that one aspect of this integration process is interpreted as the reader's efforts to
identify the information presupposed by the writer as an accepted norm and understand the
function of surface clauses in terms of their relation to this presupposed norm. The norm is
described as a propositional complex which comprises a group of propositions among which
is established the logical relation of biconditional. This view on comprehension is based on
the observation that biconditional is considered to be a logical property of norms that are
typically represented as co-occurrence of two propositions. If one of the two propositions is
affirmed, the other proposition is also affirmed: if one of the two propositions is not af-
firmed, nor is the other. The presupposed propositional relation based on biconditional is in-
ferred from the text mainly by generalizing or conceptualizing some surface clauses. In this
sense, the presupposed propositional relation is not independent of the text. It is established
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only when the reader reads the surface clauses of a particular text and make a judgment on
which part of the information contained in them has been taken for granted as given or
known up to that point in the text.
In psycholinguistics generic knowledge brought into comprehension is often explained in
terms of the notion of schema, frame, script and other similar concepts. The common char-
acteristic among these notions is that they are generic knowledge that functions as the basis
for understanding new situations. The most-cited restaurant script, for example, consists of a
sequence of expected events that one experiences at restaurants. It is considered to include
part of the sequence such as ordering dessert-having dessert served-eating dessert-pay-
ing for it. Reading about situations associated with a restaurant, the reader activates the res-
taurant script. It supplies information necessary to make inferences to connect seemingly un-
related sentences. The particular event described in the current text is matched with the pro-
totypical event of the script and this matching facilitates the construction of a coherent rep-
resentation. Such a matching process is sometimes explained in terms of the notions of slots
and fillers: the prototypical event of a script is seen as a slot while the event described in
the current text is seen as its filler, which fills in the slot.
Practically speaking, however, seeing particular text information as a filler of a slot of
the script is not so different from attaching labels such as ordering dessert and paying for it
to the surface clauses corresponding to them. With respect to a certain text reporting dining
at a restaurant, one may, on one hand, consider that the slot of the restaurant script, ordering
dessert, is filled with a surface clause: for example, Tom ordered ice-creams at Renwick.
Similarly, if it is in the same text followed by a clause such as They were served in five min-
utes, one may consider it to fill in the slot, having dessert served. On the other hand, the
same comprehension process might be interpreted as a labeling process. One may consider
that ordering desserts is a kind of label attached to the surface clause Tom ordered ice-
creams at Renwick and having order served is another label for the clause They were served
in five minutes. Attaching labels such as cause-effect to two parts of text to indicate the se-
mantic relation between them is a long established technique for describing the structure of
text without bothering to postulate any kind of conceptual entity. Labels are simply regarded
as some notes retrospectively added to the surface clauses to elucidate the relationship be-
tween them. From this point of view it is not necessary to posit a mental entity that is con-
structed during text comprehension.
The relationship between the presupposed proposition and the surface clause is actually
more than the simple relationship between a slot and a filler as described above as well as
in other places in the literature. It is a specification process in which the surface clause typi-
cally affirms that the presupposed proposition is part of the world being described and thus
assigns it a factual status. The abstract concept ordering dessert, which in itself has no ref-
erential function in relation to the real world, is now affirmed as a particular event in the
world: Tom ordered ice-creams at Renwick, for instance.
Furthermore, the generic knowledge tentatively represented as a pair of concepts such as
ordering dessert-having dessert served has a normative function which is based on the
logical relation of biconditional: (p -+ q ) 1\ ( ---, p -+ ---, q). One of the possible linguistic
translations of biconditional in terms of the current example is: if one orders dessert at a
restaurant, then one has it served, and if one doesn't order it, one doesn't have it served. It
is this presupposed norm that the surface clauses specify. The important point of this propo-
sitional complex with a normative function is that affirming one of the propositions, that is,
assigning a factual status to one of them, logically determines the statuses of all the other
propositions. For instance, if the surface clause Tom ordered ice-creams at Renwick assigns
the factual status to the proposition one orders dessert at a restaurant, the proposition one
has it served is logically expected to be assigned a factual status as well. This expectation is
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fulfilled by the surface clause They were served in five minutes. Accordingly, the other
propositions included in the norm, one doesn't order it and one doesn't have it served are
both assigned a counter-factual or hypothetical status. It is this mediatory function of surface
clauses as a linkage between propositions as conceptual entities and events in the world as
empirical entities that is not explicitly explained in the slot-filler and the label-attaching
models.
The normative function of the presupposed propositional complex is also illustrated
when the norm is deviated. For instance, if the surface sentence following Tom ordered ice-
creams at Renwick is They were not served even thirty minutes later, the status assignment
turns out to be illogical. Though one has it served is expected to be affirmed and assigned a
factual status as in the previous case, the new surface clause assigns a factual status to its
logical opposite one doesn't have it served. This unfulfilled expectation is the cause of frus-
tration on the part of the reader.
The pattern of factual status assignment is also related to the specification of the com-
plex at the interactive level. For example, the surface clause They were served in five min-
utes not only realizes the proposition one has it served but also in some context functions
as a statement of approval. They weren't served even 30 minutes later, on the other hand, af-
firms it is not served and at the same time functions as a statement of disapproval. If one
has it served is specified as a hypothetical clause such as They will be served in five min-
utes, this clause functions as a prediction or expectation. Thus the specification of the
propositional complex includes the identification of illocutionary forces performed by the
surface clauses.
The specification process of the presupposed propositional complex also includes the
identification of value that is assigned to the proposition or the event the proposition is
linked with. For example, regarding a statement as an approval or disapproval, as I did in
the previous paragraph, is based on the value awarded the proposition or the event it is
linked with: having one's dessert served in five minutes is positively valued while not hav-
ing it served for thirty minutes is negatively valued.
Thus, the mental representation that I postulate is "mental" in the sense that it is as-
sumed to be based on the generic propositional complex which is not explicit in the text and
must be inferred from the surface clauses and context. The inference is not an arbitrary
process though: the propositional complex establishes biconditional. Comprehension of the
text is interpreted as the specification process of this logical construct. The resultant mental
representation specifies at least the factual status to its elements, its illocutionary force, val-
ues awarded to its elements and its emotional effects. As a whole it represents the writer's
communicative intention.
2. The notion of mental representation in the literature before the cognitive revolution
This section reviews how the notion of mental representation and related notions had
been treated in the literature until the so-called cognitive revolution occurred in the 1950s.
The idea that generic knowledge plays an essential role in human cognition including
the use of language is a commonplace. Indeed in psychology and other related fields of
study, knowledge of the world and past experience of similar events are assumed to work as
a basis for understanding the event that one newly experiences. Such knowledge is often re-
ferred to as schema, frame, script, etc., which all refer to a generic mental representation of
a concept, event, or activity. According to Whitney (2001) the concept of schema dates as
far back as to the eighteenth century when the philosopher Immanuel Kant contemplated the
conception or schema of triangles. In so doing, Whitney explains, Kant captured the idea
that "people need mental representations that are typical of a class of objects or events so
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that we can respond to the core similarities across different stimuli of the same class."
More recently, Bartlett (1932), one of the founders of modem psychology, noted the im-
portant role knowledge plays in reconstructing discourse. Unlike the preceding studies such
as those on memorizing meaningless sequences of alphabets, his study on memory used
meaningful texts. Studying his subjects' recalling of folktales from unfamiliar culture, he no-
ticed that the reconstructed versions included various differences from the originals. For ex-
ample, in the reconstructed versions, characteristic syntactic structures of the original story
were not maintained; proper names were dropped; information the subjects found illogical
was often not remembered or was changed into reasonable forms that fit the subjects' logic;
unfamiliar terms were replaced with familiar ones as in the case of the replacement of seal
hunting with fishing; new elements were added as in the case where a moral element, which
is conventionally found in the folktales of the subjects' culture, was newly added. Such ob-
servations of the subjects' constructive recalling led to his view on schema as an 'active'
type of knowledge, and he writes, "Remembering is not the re-excitation of innumerable
fixed, lifeless, and fragmentary traces" (1932: 213). Brown and Yule (1983: 249) comment
that the active aspect of Bartlett's notion of schema is unique and is in contrast to the ordi-
nary view of it as fixed 'data structure'.
Bartlett's work was influential to the later generation of schema theorists in the 1970s
and the 1980s such as Tannen (1978,1985) and Anderson (1977). Until those years, how-
ever, his work did not receive the appropriate attention it deserved. It is because of the wave
of behaviorism which became a predominant scientific opinion in the 1930s. The notion of
mental representation was virtually banned from scientific psychology. Behaviorism was in
accordance with the strong current of empiricism which was the dominant principle upheld
by the scientific communities in America and Britain early in the twentieth century. Its main
tenet is that everything which is referred to as mental activity, including language use, can
be explained in terms of habits, or patterns of stimulus and response, built up through con-
ditioning (Malmkj::er, 1991:53). According to this principle, mental representations are not
acceptable because they are not directly observable; they are simply inferred from their ob-
servable behavioral consequences. In addition, they are not neurologically transparent: it is
difficult to say how the entities and processes hypothesized for mental representations might
be realized by currently understood neurobiological processes and structures (Gallistel,
2001).
In linguistics Bloomfield (1935) represents the behaviorist tradition and insists that a lin-
guistic theory must reject all data that are not directly observable or physically measurable.
The meaning of an abstract word is not an exception. Bloomfield finds the meaning of a
word definable only if we have the "scientific knowledge" of the matter that it refers to:
In order to give a scientifically accurate definition of meaning for every form of a
language, we should have to have a scientifically accurate knowledge of everything
in the speaker's world. The actual extent of human knowledge is very small, com-
pared to this. We can define the meaning of a speech-form accurately when this
meaning has to do with some matter of which we possess scientific knowledge. We
can define the meaning of minerals, for example, of the English word salt is 'sodium
chloride (NaCl)' ... but we have no precise way of defining words like love or hate,
which concern situations that have not been accurately classified - and these latter
are in great majority. (ibid. 139)
Rather than embarking on the study of meaning with the limited amount of "scientifically
accurate knowledge" behaviorist linguists concentrated on the identification of the units of
sound (phonemes) and the units of form (morphemes). The meaning of an utterance was
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also defined in terms of observables: it was identified with the stimulus which provokes the
utterance and the reaction that the utterance provokes. This definition, however, runs into a
problem since the same utterance can be provoked by different stimuli and provokes an un-
expected variety of responses (Lyons, 1977: 129).
Stimulus-response is a type of causal relationship and in early behaviorism all behavioral
patterns were regarded as its chain. This is related to one of the general features of behav-
iorism generally known as mechanism or determinism. In his evaluation of behaviorist se-
mantics Lyons (1977: 122) explains determinism as a claim "that everything that happens in
the world is causally determined according to the same physical laws and that this holds
true of human actions not less than it does of the movements and transformation of inani-
mate matter". Responses in their view are not intentional actions to achieve some purposes
but mechanical reflexes. In this respect the stimulus-response chain as a causal relation is
very different from the logical relation established among propositions constituting the men-
tal representation of the writer's intention.
Skinner, who belongs to a later generation of behaviorists, had a different view on utter-
ances from his predecessors. His theory is based on the three-term contingencies of rein-
forcement consisting of stimulus, response and reinforcement. In his theory utterances are
regarded as activities which operate on the environment. He called them verbal operants. A
type of verbal operant called mand, for example, can be explained in terms of such an utter-
ance as Give me some water. The utterance is seen as a response to deprivation or an aver-
sive situation, i.e. lack of water or thirstiness, which is regarded as the stimulus. The water
the speaker acquired from the listener after uttering the sentence alleviates the deprivation
and thereby reinforces the response. One important point to be noted is that in accordance
with the behaviorist's principle the notions of purposes and intentions, i.e. unobservable
mental entities, are not allowed to be incorporated into the explanation. The principle also
implies that the response is not evaluated as successful or unsuccessful since the notion of
success presupposes intention.
Skinner regards various mentalistic terms such as will, purpose, abstraction and idea as
"internal surrogates of the contingencies" or "cognitive surrogates of the real world". This
point is explained in the following passage on intention:
"Intention" is a rather similar term which once meant stretching. The cognitive ver-
sion is a critical issue in current linguistics. Must the intention of the speaker be
taken into account? In an operant analysis verbal behavior is determined by the con-
sequences which follow in a given verbal environment, and consequences are what
cognitive psychologists are really talking about when they speak of intentions. All
operant behavior "stretches toward" a future even though the only consequences re-
sponsible for its strength have already occurred. I go to a drinking fountain "with the
intention of getting a drink of water" in the sense that I go because in the past I have
got a drink when I have done so. (Skinner, 1977)
Thus Skinner argues that for the explanation of operant behavior no mental entities such as
intention are necessary.
One may wonder, however, if the intention of the speaker can really be reduced to the
similar experience in the past. In the line of Skinner's theory a man takes a pre-determined
action in face of a particular situation since he is disposed to do so. It is just as chemical re-
actions are disposed to occur in a determined sequence in scientific experiments. Actually,
though Skinner classifies it as one type of operant behavior, verbal behavior is very different
from other types of operant behavior such as the action of going to a drinking fountain. To
the situation where one is thirsty one could verbally respond in countless ways: "Let's go to
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a drinking fountain to get a drink of water"; "If we go to a drinking fountain, we can get a
drink of water"; "When I went to a drinking fountain before, I could get a drink of water";
"Unless we go to a drinking fountain, we can't get a drink of water", and so on. Setting
aside the variety of possible responses - though it is indeed one of the most prominent
characteristics of verbal behavior - uttering such sentences is, unlike actually going to a
drinking fountain, is not in itself an action that directly brings about the consequence: say-
ing a thing is different from doing it. Typically, verbal behavior is about other types of op-
erant: for instance, it recommends, prohibits or reports a non-verbal operant to achieve vari-
ous communicative goals. It is impossible to explain this aspect of language without incor-
porating mental notions such as the speaker's intention, knowledge, abstraction and proposi-
tion' all of which Skinner regards unobservable mental surrogates of experience. It may be
true that some types of human behavior are accounted for as responses which have been re-
inforced by past experiences without resorting to unobservable concepts such as intention.
Verbal behavior or the use of language, however, is not reducible to the contingencies of re-
inforcement.
3. Cognitive linguistics and mental representation in Chomsky's theory
As a response to behaviorism which rejected mentalistic notions, the so-called cognitive
revolution occurred in the 1950s with the development of artificial intelligence, computer
science and neuroscience which contributed to making the mental process more tangible.
The status of the mentalistic notions including mental representation has changed in the lit-
erature and they became commonly used terms in cognitive psychology and cognitive lin-
guistics. The study of meaning, which had been postponed for some time, though there had
been some behavioristic approaches as was mentioned in the previous section, finally started
attracting many researchers' attention.
When linguists embarked on the study of meaning, however, they believed that the prin-
ciples and techniques successfully introduced in phonology could be reapplied to the analy-
sis of meaning. They attempted to identify the system of the basic units of meaning and de-
scribe the semantic properties of various expressions in terms of those basic units. One of
the approaches based on this principle is a type of semantic study of lexemes, which is
commonly known as componential analysis. This approach is based on "the thesis that the
sense of every lexeme can be analyzed in terms of a set of more general sense-components
or semantic features, some or all of which will be common to several different lexemes in
the vocabulary (Lyons, 1977: vol. 1, 317). Some advocates of this approach further claim
that at least some type of sense-components is considered to be language-neutral or univer-
sal atomic concepts.
Actually, the psychological reality and the universality of sense-components have often
been called into doubt (Lyons, ibid. 333). One of the corollaries of componential analysis is
the idea that comprehension is the process of decomposition of expressions into the basic set
of semantic components. Comprehending John is a bachelor means representing it as John
is an unmarried man. Some psychological experiments have, however, reported that this
kind of decomposition is not always happening in comprehension. Another problem of sense
-components is that though they are often assumed to be mental entities, they are regarded
as elements of the system which is independent of the use of language in particular con-
texts. Since particular contexts are excluded from or only "ideal" contexts are taken into
consideration in componential analysis, proposed sense-components for a lexeme often lack
applicability and cannot be maintained in various contexts with unique features. They are
one of the concepts related to the view of language as a system as opposed to language in
use.
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In linguistics the term cognitive revolution is most closely related to Noam Chomsky
who attacked then predominant linguistic trends based on behaviorism represented by Skin-
ner. In contrast to behaviorists who exclude mental phenomena Chomsky believes that the
structure of language is determined by the structure of the human mind. He finds mental en-
tities such as mental representations necessary to talk about the state of mind or brain at a
certain level of abstraction (Chomsky: 1988). They are not related to metaphysical notions
but related to brain mechanism which is a physical phenomenon like all the other targets of
scientific studies though its property is yet to be discovered.
Chomsky denies, for example, Bloomfield's view of language as the totality of utter-
ances that can be made in a speech community. He refers to the language thus defined as "E
-Language", where "E" is intended to suggest "extensional" and "externalized". He charac-
terizes the definition of this type as follows:
The definition is "extensional" in that it takes language to be a set of objects of
some kind, and it is "externalized" in the sense that language, so defined, is external
to the mindlbrain. Thus a set, however chosen, is plainly external to the mindlbrain.
(Chomsky, 1988:558)
Chomsky claims that grammars constructed to explain E-languages necessarily have serious
theoretical problems in that there can be no boundaries for the set chosen for the description
and that it is impossible to have coherent criteria to exclude any sentences from the set. He
also argues that if E-language is taken to be the object of description, choice of grammar for
it can be a matter of convenience without any facts about the mindlbrain to justify the
choice. According to him E-language is an artifact and considering formal properties about
it is quite confused and pointless.
As opposed to E-language Chomsky presents the notion of "I-language", which he re-
gards as the correct target to be described by grammar. "I" is to suggest "intensional" and
"internalized." I-language is explained as follows:
The I-language is what the grammar purports to describe: a system represented in the
mindlbrain, ultimately in physical mechanisms that are now largely unknown, and is
in this sense internalized; a system that is intensional in that it may be regarded as a
specific function considered in intension-that is, a specific characterization of a
function-which assigns a status to a vast range of physical events, ... (Chomsky,
1988)
I-language was first explained as a rule system, which includes phrase structure rules, lexical
rules, transformational rules, phonological rules, and rules of semantic interpretation. In
spite of their names rules of semantic interpretation do not relate the language to the world
but connect two syntactic entities; syntactic structures and LF-representations or logical
forms. The kinds of rules and their interrelation are specified by the so-called universal
grammar. It is a system of general principles which are commonly applicable to the struc-
ture of all the human languages and represents the initial state of the language faculty prior
to the acquisition of a particular I-language. Later, it became clear that there are simply too
many possible rule systems to represent I-language as consistent linguistic knowledge of
universal quality. Chomsky decided to abandon the rule-system approach and shifted to what
he calls a principles-and-parameters approach. Different I-languages are considered to result
from the choice of different values for the parameters that are set by the general principles
of universal grammar.
In the light of the present discussion on the notion of mental representations, I-language
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itself can be regarded as the mental representation of linguistic knowledge of the ideal
speaker-hearer. At a lower scale, sentences generated by the rules of I-language can also be
seen as mental representations. It is important, however, to note that sentences belonging to
I-language are not related to a particular situation of the world since they are not properties
of language in use but language as a system. The contrast between the two notions, lan-
guage as a system and language in use, reminds one of Chomsky's more established distinc-
tion between competence and performance. Indeed, the notion of competence roughly corre-
sponds to that of I-language while the notion of performance corresponds to that of E-
language.
Chomsky's trivialization of E-language or performance has naturally drawn strong criti-
cism from many linguists. de Beaugrande (1999), for example, writes:
This renewed mentalism in effect set out to study cognition instead of language, as-
piring to construct 'a theory of linguistic structure' without 'reference to particular
languages' (Chomsky 1957:11). Eventually, real language-now called 'externalized
language' (or 'e-language' for short)-was declared to be a mere 'epiphenomenon'
(Chomsky 1986:25) In these 'radically different theories', 'there are no constructions;
there are no rules' (Chomsky 1991:81) This version of cognitive linguistics is con-
cerned solely with 'the structure of mental representation' and expressly excludes
'the relationship between' 'mental representations' 'and things in the world' (Chom-
sky 1991 :93) The exclusion carries ironic (and probably unintentional) echoes of
Bloomfield's much earlier exclusion <of mentalistic notions>
(original emphasis and quotation, < > is mine)
Relationship between mental representations and things in the world, exclusion of which de
Beaugrande criticizes in this paragraph, must be distinguished from what Chomsky describes
as a specific characterization of a function-which assigns a status to a vast range of physi-
cal events, which is found in Chomsky's definition of I-language quoted earlier. The linkage
between I-language and physical events Chomsky explains in terms of characteristic func-
tions is a concept related to language as a system whereas what de Beaugrande finds miss-
ing in Chomsky's theory is the relationship that is established between mental representa-
tions and things in the world in the real use of language in a particular situation.
Excluding performance or use of language from the theory Chomsky also seems to have
excluded a type of mental entity that is assumed to motivate and control it: intention of the
language users. Commenting on the production of language as opposed to the perception of
language, Chomsky (1988:568) associates the production problem with "Descartes' problem"
which is related to the existence of other minds. Chomsky writes, "This problem, one aspect
of more general problems concerning will and choice, remains beyond the scope of serious
human inquiry in fact, and may be so in principle, rather as Descartes suggested." Admitting
that it is too speculative to claim anything about the speaker/writer's productive process only
on the basis of linguistic data as products, intention or will seems to be concerned not only
with the production process but also with the perception process. It seems to be quite natu-
ral to think that the listener/reader approaches the produced utterance with the intention to
understand the speaker/hearer's intention. I believe that it is possible to identify some com-
mon elements of the intention shared between the language users as long as they are com-
mitted to the same act of communication.
To Chomsky, however, communication or interaction among language users is not the
main characteristic of language. Chomsky (1988:566) writes that "the language faculty, part
of the mind/brain, is in crucial part a system of digital computation of a highly restricted
character, with simple principles that interact to yield very intricate and complex results,"
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which accounts for the creative aspect of language use. The digital computation system is
required to employ recursive rules and associated mental representations as the basis for
thought. He goes on to write that "it is doubtful that any sense can be given to the idea that
human language is a communication system, though it can be used for communication along
with much else."
This characteristic of Chomsky's theory is pointed out by Lyons (1991: 196), who writes
that Chomsky insists that languages are essentially (cognitively-based) systems of represen-
tation rather than systems of communication, which is the basis for his individualistic as op-
posed to social view of languages. In response to Chomsky's view on languages Lyons
writes as follows:
.. .it is hard to deny that the grammatical structure of natural languages would not be
as it is if they had not been used, over the millennia during which each of them has
acquired its own structure, primarily, if not exclusively, for communication (in the
broadest sense) among social beings. This has two discernible consequences: (i) that
a good deal of the structure of most, if not all, human languages is dialogic (and
their dialogic structure is put to use even in monologue and internal, or unspoken,
soliloquy); (ii) that in many languages the social roles and status-based interpersonal
relations that are operative in the society in which the language functions are en-
coded inextricably in its grammatical categories and their interdependencies.
(Lyons,1991: 196)
Lyons also points out that in addition to the problem of neglecting the effects of use of lan-
guage on its structure Chomsky is open to the criticism that by giving priority to proposi-
tional or cognitive meaning in contrast with non-propositional meaning he hasn't paid
enough attention to the expressions of will, desire, and emotions.
One can easily notice that little emphasis placed on these mentalistic expressions natu-
rally results from the exclusion of use of language from Chomsky's theory. Use of language
is considered to be motivated by the language users' will, desire, emotions, and so on. I
claim that they might be regarded as important elements of the mental representation of the
language users' communicative intention. Once such a mental representation is postulated,
one cannot help wondering what relationship it has with I-language as a type of mental rep-
resentation. It is intention that determines how the system of linguistic knowledge should be
used and what type of relation is established between mental representations and things or
events in the world. Any use of language presupposes intention. By virtue of this fact it
seems to be quite natural to think that intention also has some effects on the structure of
language. Thus considered, it seems to be hardly justifiable to exclude use of language from
the theory. At least the status of I-language does not seem to be as independent as it is sup-
posed in Chomsky's theory.
It should be noted here that Chomsky has been aware of the unique features of those
mentalistic notions. Chomsky, however, seems to think that intention is characterized as an
element of lexical structure incorporated into I-language. It is not explained in terms of the
language users' communicative motivation which controls the use of I-language. Under the
principles-and-parameters approach lexicon gains its significance since unique features of
various languages that are not universally explained in terms of the general principles and
parameters are attributed to properties of lexical items. With respect to the acquisition of
lexical items Chomsky maintains that the concepts of lexical items are innately available and
the children have only to assign labels to these predetermined concepts. Below is quoted a
passage to show Chomsky's view of intention as a basic element of lexical structure:
notions like actor, recipient of action, event, intention, and others are pervasive
elements of lexical structure, with their specific properties and permitted interrela-
tion. Consider, say, the words chase or persuade. Like their Spanish equivalents,
they clearly involve a reference to human intention. To chase Jones is not only to
follow him, but to follow him with the intent of staying on his path, perhaps to catch
him. To persuade Smith to do something is to cause him to decide or intend to do it;
if he never decides or intends to do it we have not succeeded in persuading him.
Furthermore, he must decide or intend by his own volition, not under duress; if we
say that the police persuaded Smith to confess by torture, we are using the term
ironically. Since these facts are known essentially without evidence, it must be that
the child approaches language with an intuitive understanding of concepts involving
intending, causation, goal of action, event, and so on, and places the words that are
heard in a nexus that is permitted by the principles of universal grammar, which pro-
vides the framework for thought and language, and are common to human languages
as conceptual systems that enter into various aspects of human life. (Chomsky, 1988:
574)
While human intention is explained as an element related to lexical items such as chase and
persuade, it is explained, like other mentalistic concepts such as causation, goal of action
and event, as something that the child has intuitively understood when he approaches lan-
guage. Thus characterized as a type of intuitive property which is not the internal part of the
principles of universal grammar, of which description is Chomsky's main concern, intention
seems to have been sidelined.
One remembers that whether it is linguistic behavior or other types of operant behavior
Skinner denied the relevance of intention to it by reducing it to past experiences as was dis-
cussed earlier. It is ironical that intention was marginalized also in Chomsky's theory which
is often regarded as a reaction against the behaviorism. Neither in Skinner's behaviorism nor
in Chomsky's cognitive linguistics did the language user's communicative intention play any
important role.
4. Discourse analysis as the study of language in use
Since the discovery of the morphemes of a language, the task of the linguist was for a
long time to discover how morphemes may be combined to construct a sentence, which was
regarded as the maximum structural unit of language. When one considers the language
user's intention, however, it soon becomes apparent that it cannot be explained by simply
observing the properties within the syntactic boundary. For instance, the act of chasing
somebody, as Chomsky also wrote, usually means that the chaser not only follows the same
route as the person being chased but also intends to catch him as a result, which might be
expressed as an event in two or more different sentences. In such a case one cannot dis-
cusses the chaser's intention only in terms of one of the sentences: intention cannot be seen
as something that is contained within a sentential boundary.
The syntactic boundary of the linguistic study was not broken until scholars known as
discourse analysts embarked on the analysis of a unit larger than the sentence. One of the
Post-Bloomfieldians, Zellig Harris (1952), attempted to develop discovery procedures for the
structure above the sentence level based on distributional principles. Just as semanticists in
those days applied the analytical techniques used in the field of phonology to the study of
meaning and tried to identify semantic components as the basic set of concepts, Harris tried
to apply the techniques developed in phonology to the analysis of discourse. His attempt,
however, was not successful for various reasons. Unlike in the case of the identification of
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phonemes, for example, with no aid of computational concordance techniques available in
those days it was almost impossible to collect a sufficient amount of data for the identifica-
tion of the same sequence of words as a unit. His interest in the larger unit of language,
however, was shared by British discourse analysts though their approaches were totally dif-
ferent from his. Probably the most influential among them were the members of a research
group at the University of Birmingham such as John Sinclair and Malcolm Coulthard. Sin-
clair (1994: 13) recalls the development in the field since the 1950s, when scholars started
to devise a number of approaches to account for larger patterns of language. He writes that
discourse study took off when speech acts (Austin 1962) were identified in philosophy and
in the same place commented on Chomsky's linguistics as "cognitive, non-textual linguis-
tics" (Sinclair, 1994: 14).
Chomsky's search for linguistic universals is contradictory to the approach taken by the
discourse analysts, who tried to analyze the very thing which Chomsky excluded from his
study: language in use. One of the most famous and pioneer works was that on spoken dis-
course by Sinclair and Coulthard (1975). Their theory has later been developed and applied
to various types of discourse by other scholars such as Tsui (1986), Dave Willis(1992),
Francis and Hunston(1992) and Jane Wills(1992). Though I am mainly concerned with writ-
ten discourse in this paper, Sinclair and Coulthard's work might as well be briefly discussed
since their analysis of language in use as a physical entity is useful for comparatively illus-
trating what I mean by mental representations of the language users' intention.
Sinclair and Coulthard studied the teacher-pupil interaction in the classroom situation.
They worked in the tradition of functional linguistics represented by scholars such as Halli-
day (1961). They used a rank-scale model of description based on the principle that a unit at
a given rank is made up of one or more units of the rank below and combines with other
units at the same rank to make one unit at rank above. At the level of discourse they pro-
posed in descending order the ranks of lesson, transaction, exchange, move and act. The
rank of exchange has two subtypes: boundary and teaching exchanges. The former consists
of frame and focus while the latter consists of initiation, response and feedback. The rank
of move has subtypes called framing and focusing which respectively correspond to frame
and focus at the rank of exchange, and other subtypes called opening, answering and follow
-up, which respectively correspond to initiation, response and feedback at the rank of ex-
change. At the lowest rank each part of discourse is coded as some type of act such as elici-
tation, reply, accept and evaluate. For instance, a typical exchange of teaching in the class-
room has the sequence of three types: an initiation by the teacher, followed by a response
from the pupil, followed by feedback to the pupil's response from the teacher. It is labeled
at the rank of move as an opening, answering and follow-up sequence. These three subtypes
of move are respectively analyzed as including elicitation, reply and evaluation as their
head at the rank of act.
In order to maintain the consistency in the theory, similar terms such as response, an-
swering and reply are used as labels for naming the same part of discourse at different
ranks. Such a structure-oriented analysis has been criticized by some scholars like Levinson
(1983:294) who claims that the domain of conversation is not a structural product and is not
appropriately described in the same way that a sentence is. Sinclair (1994,16) himself also
warns of projecting descriptive techniques used for one area upwards into other areas though
using familiar tools is a reasonable tactic for getting started. In spite of some problems that
have been pointed out, their studies are in the light of the present discussion very important
in that language in use is the target of their description and that those labels attached to part
of discourse show the types of speech acts which are considered to represent the intention of
the language users.
It is important, however, to notice that Sinclair and Coulthard are not concerned with
any mental entities or mental representations of the language users. They are simply trying
to describe observable physical characteristics of text within the theoretical framework of a
scale and category model. Their approach is practical and realistic in that they do not have
to posit any mental entities to support their theory and they objectively describe what exists
there, text as a product. They do not claim that labeling part of discourse with some types
of act represents what is happening in the language users' mind during the communication.
Their emphasis on the physical and observable entity as the object of description is, for ex-
ample, reflected in their analysis of "Teacher Direct". One of the teacher's utterances such
as "I want you to take your pen and I want you to rub it as hard as you can on something
woolen" is regarded as an opening move which is labeled as an act of directive. It is fol-
lowed by an answering move, which is labeled as an act of reaction. The label of reaction,
however, is attached to the real action of the pupils' rubbing their pens on something
woolen. Sinclair and Coulthard do not postulate any mental entity such as a proposition
which represents the pupils' action in some conceptual representation of this communicative
event. Admitting the usefulness of Sinclair and Coulthard's approach based on concrete lin-
guistic and situational evidence beyond the syntactic boundary, their analysis seems to be
nothing more than labeling part of text and its accompanying extra-linguistic event. The la-
bels are what are retrospectively attached to part of text by the analyst rather than what are
attached to the elements of the mental representation of the communicative event con-
structed by the participants, i.e. the teacher or the student. Constructing such a mental repre-
sentation requires more than simply attaching labels of speech act to part of the discourse
and some situational facts.
Identification of the type of illocutionary force of an utterance is one of the most impor-
tant aspects of the analysis proposed by Sinclair and Coulthard. It is, however, not straight-
forward as is evidenced by the presence of various inference theories of indirect speech act.
Though this problem may not be so obvious in strongly conventionalized situations such as
class-room teaching, there is always some possibility for subjectivity in the judgment. Lev-
inson points out this problem as follows:
'" there simply is no simple form-to-force correlation, and the attempts to bridge the
gap (between what utterances 'literally' mean and 'actually' do in the way of actions)
with theory of indirect speech acts have provided at best only partial solutions. For
questions of context, both sequential (or discourse) context and extra-linguistic con-
text, can play a crucial role in the assignment of utterance function. We can expect,
therefore, no simple 'force convention' rules to supply a general solution here, but
rather some immensely complex inferential process that utilizes information of many
different kinds. (1983:291)
Levinson (1983: 290) also points out that some single-sentence utterances perform more
than one speech act at a time. Sinclair and Coulthard of course have been aware of the diffi-
culties and have incorporated the notions of situation and tactics. In situation, information
about the non-linguistic environment is used to reclassify items that were first classified by
grammatical properties into statement, question and command. In addition, the discourse
value of an item is determined by taking into account its tactics or sequential properties: lin-
guistic items that have preceded it, linguistic items that are expected to follow or that has
followed in the text. Subjectivity included in determining the type of illocutionary force is
not the problem of the theory but simply reflects the difficulty of the task. In their theory,
however, the difficulty is what the analyst feels in his analysis of the text rather than what
the conversationalists experience in real communication.
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5. Conclusion
In Section 1 I have briefly introduced the mental representation of comprehension which
represents the writer's communicative intention. Some of its main characteristics illustrated
there can now be better understood in comparison with various mentalistic notions that had
been accepted or rejected by prominent scholars advocating different principles before the
early 1980s.
The importance of generic knowledge and its active use in comprehension by the lan-
guage user are well demonstrated by Bartlett's observation of his subjects who "construc-
tively" recalled culturally unfamiliar folktales. Undoubtedly, such background knowledge or
what is called schema by later theorists is crucial for inferring implicit information to con-
struct a coherent mental representation of text. However, the cultural and situational qualities
of schemata are not the intrinsic qualities of the mental representation with which I am con-
cerned. It consists of propositions which can be specified by more general concepts such as
response and consequence than particular situational concepts such as ordering a dessert
and paying for it. Its elements are characterized at a more abstract level and neutral with re-
spect to those situational concepts. Schemata as generic knowledge are usually explained as
a chain of actions or events with no logical relation postulated among them. It should be
emphasized that the writer's communicative intention is characterized by the logical relation
of biconditional.
It is obvious that behaviorists would never have accepted such a mentalistic notion as
the writer's communicative intention. It is interesting, however, to compare the simple tem-
poral relation holding between stimulus and response and biconditional holding among the
propositions representing the writer's communicative intention. The stimulus-response se-
quence is a one-way relation: stimulus always precedes response and never the other way
round. Stimulus is automatically followed by response like a reflex. On the other hand, bi-
conditional, which is often symbolically represented as p =q, is a two-way relation. Due
to this logical quality the reader expects the truth of p based on the truth of q just as he ex-
pects the truth of q based on the truth of p. Besides, biconditional is a two-dimensional re-
lation: it offers not only the positive but also the negative sequence. The reader can expect
the falsity of q based on the falsity of p, and the falsity of p based on the falsity of q. The
stimulus-response sequence, on the other hand, is one-dimensional: it is not concerned with
the situation where stimulus or response does not materialize. Reversing the temporal se-
quence and the truth value of propositions seem to be essential operations relevant to the
construction of intention.
Chomsky's I-language and universal grammar are a language internalized as a system:
language in use was discarded as 'epiphenomenon'. The internalized language, however,
does not incorporate the notion of intention, which was set aside as something intuitively
understood by the child when he approaches the language. If intention is as in my model
accounted for as biconditional established among a set of propositions rather than as a prop-
erty of one individual proposition, it is natural that intention was excluded from Chomsky's
syntactic study as something beyond the syntactic boundary.
Discourse analysts, Sinclair and Coulthard, identified the structure beyond the syntactic
boundary. However, they decided to stay on the surface of discourse: their analysis is basi-
cally understood as attaching some speech-act labels to part of the text. Besides, labeling is
regarded as the analyst's act and does not reflect the language user's intention. On the other
hand, the mental representation of the writer's communicative intention presupposes the un-
derlying logical relation of biconditional, which is symbolically represented as (p -+ q) 1\
( I P -+ I q). It is to the elements of this formula that labels such as response and conse-
quence are attached. The labeled formula functions as a type of frame: the elements such as
p (response), q (desirable consequence), I p (alternative response) and I q (undesirable
consequence) function as slots to be filled with fillers - i.e. specific propositions retrieved
from the text. This specification process is the act of the reader comprehending the text.
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